Abstract -
INTRODUCTION

E
conomists consider the property tax a critical component in the delivery of public services by local governments (Fisher, 1996) . McGuire (1999) suggests that the benefi ts of the property tax as a source of local revenue have become "almost dogma" among public fi nance economists.
1 The property tax, however, does not always measure up to the benefi ts suggested in the literature. In practice, the property tax often suffers from several shortcomings, with one of the most serious shortcomings occurring when the property tax is nonuniform (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989; Rosen, 2002) .
Administration of the property tax requires that a taxable value be set on a specifi c date (lien date) by an elected or appointed public offi cial. Valuation is diffi cult, and assessors are often underfunded and understaffed, making the task even more diffi cult. The taxable value for other taxes is based on actual and reoccurring economic events such as sales or Nonuniform property tax administration can result in similar properties not having similar property tax burdens. Two measures are used by tax administrators to account for nonuniformity in property tax administration. The fi rst measure is vertical equity, which results when the assessment ratio (AV/SP)-the ratio of assessed value (AV) to sales price (SP)-is uniform across property value ranges. The second measure is horizontal equity, which results when the assessment ratio is uniform across properties with similar market values. Concerns with both vertical and horizontal equity have been extensively explored for single-family residential properties, with most research emphasizing vertical equity. Although early analysis of property tax equity for single-family housing reported nonuniformity (Oldman and Aaron 1965) , recent results have been more promising (Sirmans, Diskin and Friday, 1995; Sunderman, Birch, Cannaday and Hamilton, 1990; Birch, Sunderman and Hamilton, 1990; Goolsby, 1997) . 2 The same pattern exits for tests of horizontal equity. Early studies found serious problems with regard to horizontal equity (Berry and Bednarz, 1975; Haurin and Jensen, 1988) , but more recent studies (Goolsby, 1997; Allen and Dare, 2002) have found evidence of improving horizontal equity in single-family housing. 3 Researchers have reported on the horizontal and vertical equity of the property tax on multifamily housing (Allen, 2003; Cornia and Slade, 2005) and farmland (Spahr and Sunderman, 1998; Bowman and Mikesell, 1988) . However, except for the research in the 1960s by Oldman and Arron (1965) , the uniformity of the property tax on business and commercial property has generally gone unexamined or at least has not been reported in the literature. McDonald (1993) offers a hint of what we expect to fi nd in our analysis. In his study of property values of 259 commercial buildings in Chicago, the unexplained variation in commercial property taxes was so large that he classifi ed the property tax as an exogenous variable. Like McDonald, Man (1995) reports that the quality of the public assessment of commercial property showed substantial variation in the mid 1980s in Phoenix, Arizona. But like McDonald, Man did not empirically examine the observed non-uniformity in the property tax.
In this article we extend the research on the uniformity of the property tax by examining the horizontal equity of assessed valuations on nonresidential properties. Using methodologies similar to those used to examine horizontal equity in the valuation of residential homes, we investigate horizontal equity between apartment, industrial, offi ce, and retail properties in Maricopa County (Metropolitan Phoenix), Arizona.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews how the property tax impacts business operations and why nonuniform tax burdens may create problems for owners of commercial properties. The third section reviews assessment methods in Maricopa County and the data used in this research, while the fourth section describes the methods used to test for horizontal equity. The fi fth section reports the empirical fi ndings, and the sixth section concludes the study and offers public policy suggestions.
THE IMPACT OF THE PROPERTY TAX ON BUSINESS OPERATIONS
Many businesses are able to minimize or avoid the burden of state corporate income taxes (Fox and Luna, 2002; Multistate Tax Commission, 2003) ; however, businesses fi nd it diffi cult to avoid the property tax, a signifi cant cost of doing business. The Council on State Taxation (COST) reports that over the past ten years, business property tax has increased over 38 percent, while state corporate income tax has decreased (Reason, 2004) . For many businesses, property tax is the single largest tax bill they pay. For example, in a study of the business tax burden across the United States, Cline, Fox, Neubig and Phillips, (2004) report that in 41 of the 50 states, the property tax represents over 30 percent of the total business tax burden, while in 40 states, the relative burden of the state corporate income tax is less than ten percent.
4 From a fi rm-level perspective, both Mills (1980) and Youngman (2002) illustrate how a modest property tax based on the asset value of structures and land is comparable to making the public sector a partner in a fi rm with a one-fi fth claim on the enterprise, regardless of the fi rm's actual income. As Youngman notes, the public partner shares in the proceeds of the fi rm, but not in the risks. In fact, with a property tax, the public is generally shielded from the risks because the tax is imposed regardless of the fi rm's actual income.
There is a substantial history of research on the effect of interjurisdictional differences in effective property tax rates on residential property values. The results of this stream of research are that differential interjurisdictional property tax rates are capitalized into housing values, although the results are mixed with respect to methodology and the degree of capitalization (Palmon and Smith, 1998) .
At issue is if this same pattern of differential capitalization would hold for business properties and if it matters? The existing literature strongly implies that the property tax has an economically meaningful impact on the owners of capital. Using data on sold commercial properties, Man (1995) found that differences in effective property tax rates between communities within the Phoenix Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) were partially capitalized into the selling price of commercial property. In fact Man (1995) fi nds that over 70 percent of interjurisdictional differences on commercial property taxes are borne by property owners. Wheaton (1984) examines the effects of differences in property tax rates on commercial buildings in 22 cities in the Boston area. His results suggest that 75 percent of the differential burden on both capital and property is borne by the business owners, not the consumers. Using data from Chicago, McDonald (1993) estimates that 55 percent of the differential in the property tax is borne by the owners of commercial properties.
While the prior studies focus on the absolute burden of the property tax on busi-ness properties, our study focuses on how that tax is (unequally) distributed across different types of business properties, thereby providing evidence of horizontal inequity across property owners. In the context of Mills' (1980) and Youngman's (2002) observations that the public sector becomes a partner in a fi rm via a property tax, it follows that nonuniform property tax burdens create uneven partnerships. In addition, the recent work of Ihlanfelt (2004) suggests that if the responsibility for evaluating appraisal practices is left solely to local assessors, it may result in biased outcomes. Our study provides a much-needed independent analysis of appraisal practices.
5 In our conclusion, we show that the effective property taxes are capitalized in the value of the land and buildings, and give an example of the significance of the uneven assessment between classes of property in our sample.
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ASSESSMENT METHODS IN MARICOPA COUNTY AND EMPIRICAL DATA
Assessment Methods
The Maricopa County assessor is elected in a partisan process and is responsible for appraising all property in the county for property tax purposes. The appraisal principles followed by the assessor are generally nonpolitical and are established by state constitutional and statutory law, valuation regulations determined by the Arizona Department of Revenue, as well as a series of ongoing judicial interpretations. The assessor's offi ce also follows professional standards of appraisal practice developed by the International Association of Assessing Officers and the Appraisal Foundation. In addition, the method of equalized financing for K-12 education in Arizona requires county assessors to maintain property assessment levels to prevent unwarranted transfers from the state general fund to local school districts. This outcome is monitored by the Arizona Department of Revenue, and when assessment levels fall short of the legal requirement, the Department orders counties to conduct reappraisals. However, there are resource constraints placed on the assessor by other elected offi cials who determine the assessor's operating and capital budgets; these fi nancial constraints limit the amount of time and resources allocated to the appraisal process. Currently, the assessor's office employs about 100 employees who work on the appraisal of 1.3 million parcels, with the amount of funding approximated at $12.00 per parcel per year. This is in stark contrast to fee appraisers, who typically charge hundreds or even thousands of dollars to value individual properties.
Arizona property tax law requires that the assessor estimate an assessed value that reflects full cash or market value (Arizona Revised Statutes: 42-11054(B)). In Maricopa County, the assessor uses different valuation methods depending on the type and size of the property. For smaller apartment complexes (those with fewer than 13 units), the assessor uses a hedonic regression sales comparison approach, while for larger apartment complexes (those with more than 12 units), the assessor uses a hedonic regression income approach. During the period of our study, the county assessor was revaluing multifamily property on an annual basis. 7 Industrial, offi ce, and retail properties in Maricopa County are appraised annually using the cost approach. 8 These appraisals are based on cost manuals prepared by the Arizona Department of Revenue and the preparation of these manuals relies heavily on data acquired from cost manuals prepared by national appraisal fi rms. The reappraisals do not include actual visits to the sites; instead, they are based on the application of current construction data from the cost manuals to the known structural characteristics of the appraised properties.
Unlike apartments in Maricopa County, where the land and improvements are assessed jointly, the land associated with offi ce, retail, and industrial property is appraised separately using a hedonic regression model that is applied biannually.
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The tax rate is uniformly applied to all property, but the assessment level differs by class of property. There are two iterations made to arrive at the differential assessments. First, a legislative initiative allows the full cash value (assessed value) to be reduced to 82 percent of estimated market value. This allowance is applied to all properties and is intended to reduce the consequence of time to sell property, fi nancing costs, personal property and potential appraisal errors. We found no evidence that the reduction in assessed value is not uniformly applied to all properties. Second, the reduced cash value of residential properties is multiplied by 10 percent, and commercial and industrial properties are multiplied by 25 percent. For example, if the cash value of a residential property is $100,000, it is fi rst reduced to 82 percent, or $82,000, and then reduced to $20,500, or 25 percent of the $82,000. A residential home of similar cash value would be taxed at $8,200, or 10 percent of 82,000.
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Empirical Data
The data used in this study consist of market transactions that occurred in Maricopa County, Arizona, from January 1998 through June 2003. Maricopa County comprises 28 incorporated cities and exceeds three million residents. As with many sunbelt communities, Maricopa County has experienced rapid growth during the last few decades. For instance, the county's population grew by over 44 percent during the 1990s. In terms of property sectors, offi ce property increased by about 48 percent, industrial property by 19 percent, and residential property by 73 percent. 7 Cornia and Slade (2005) provide a detailed overview of Maricopa County tax assessment of multifamily housing. 8 The income approach is typically viewed as the most accurate method for appraising commercial and industrial property (Janata, 1993); however, this approach is often the most diffi cult to employ because of the lack of available data (Wheaton and Torto, 1994) . 9 The assessor uses land valuation models for distinct geographic areas of the county and further subdivides these areas into "neighborhoods" distinguished by natural boundaries and manmade barriers. The model regresses the natural log of sales price of known sales of vacant land against a variety of variables, including the square footage of the parcel, the frontage of the parcel, location data, and the relative proximity to fl ood plains and fl ight zones. The majority of the variables are binary, such as the type of street (arterial, corner, freeway access), allowed uses, type of utilities, access to rail lines, and contamination. 10 One likely effect of this policy is to provide the assessor and the assessment process with an acceptable "cushion of error." Allen and Dare (2002) and Goolsby (1997) suggest that assessing offi cials may intentionally underassess properties in order to minimize tax appeals; however, property tax uniformity can be maintained as long as all properties in a jurisdiction have a uniform assessment ratio. If the assessment ratio is not uniform across properties, then deliberate underassessment makes it diffi cult for property owners to seek relief because an adjustment to property tax is allowed only if the assessed value exceeds market value. Property owners may appeal on other issues like nonuniformity, but the possibility of a successful appeal is essentially zero.
The transactions data were obtained from CoStar Group, Inc., which investigates real estate transactions by physically inspecting each property and confi rming the particulars of the transaction with the relevant parties, including buyer, seller, and broker.
11 CoStar also reports its evaluation of property condition and the assessed value of each property at the time of sale, as reported by the Maricopa County assessor.
From January 1998 through June 2003, CoStar reported 7,013 apartment, industrial, offi ce, and retail property transactions; of these, 822 transactions exhibited unusual conditions of sale.
12 Also, an additional 462 transactions were identifi ed as being part of a tax-deferred exchange.
13 Because these unusual conditions of sale can have a signifi cant impact on transaction price that may bias the results of our study, we eliminated these data from the analysis. Also, some transactions were missing data on important variables including building size, lot size, and assessed valuation. In total, 1,138 transactions were missing important data; we eliminated these sales from the study. After examining the remaining data, we found that some transactions had unusually high or low assessment ratios. Therefore, we eliminated the top and bottom one percent of the remaining transactions (92 transactions) based on the assessment ratio in order to remove these questionable data. Table 1 summarizes how we eliminated questionable or incomplete transactions from the original data set. 11 CoStar Goup, Inc. investigates and compiles real estate transaction data in many cities in the U.S., including Phoenix, Arizona. CoStar verifi es the accuracy and legal nature of the reported sales. Summaries of the transactions are provided to interested parties on a subscription basis. We thank Craig Farrington for his generous assistance with the data. 12 Unusual conditions of sale include property contamination, property sold as part of an assemblage, property sold out of bankruptcy or in an auction, property sold with ground lease, etc. Slade (2004) fi nds that unusual conditions of sale can have a substantial impact on the transaction's price. 13 Holmes and Slade (2001) fi nd that exchange status can have a substantial impact on transaction price. Because we have limited information on the exchange status of these transactions, we have eliminated these sales from the investigation.
The remaining transactions total 4,499, a substantial data set for investigation. Table 2 , Panel A outlines the descriptive statistics of the continuous variables for each of the four property types.
Office properties comprise 874 observations, while retail properties comprise 1,306 observations; apartment and industrial properties fall between offi ce and retail properties at 1,142 and 1,177 observations, respectively. The range in transaction prices and property characteristics illustrates the diverse nature of these four property types. It is clear that apartments generally have the highest values, with a mean sales price of $3.2 million, while the values of offi ce properties are the most diverse, with a standard deviation of $6.4 million. The data also show that apartment, industrial, and offi ce properties have a relatively narrow range of mean assessment ratios of 0.685 to 0.772; the assessment ratio for retail properties is substantially less at 0.588.
The median sales price and assessed value sheds further light onto the characteristics of the dataset. For instance, the median sales price for apartments is $900,000, whereas for industrial, offi ce, and retail it is $850,000, inferring that the dataset is highly represented by properties in the $800,000 to $900,000 range. It is interesting to note that the median sales price is 48 percent, 49 percent, and 44 percent higher than the median assessed value for apartment, industrial, and offi ce properties, respectively. However, for retail properties this spread is 96 percent, or double that of the other three property types. In short, the measures of central tendency (mean and median) suggest that retail properties are routinely underassessed compared with the other property types.
Another interesting variable in Panel A of Table 2 is the land-to-building (LTB) ratio, calculated by dividing the land area by the building area. The data shows that the LTB ratio for retail properties is 8.71, or about twice the size of industrial and offi ce properties at 5.11 and 4.46, respectively, or about three times the size of apartments at 2.76. In addition, the standard deviation of the LTB ratio for retail properties is much larger than for the other property types. This high variability in the land and building relationship for retail properties may be a fi rst indication that retail properties in Maricopa County may be harder to value, thereby explaining the observed underassessment of retail properties compared with apartment, industrial, and offi ce properties. 
TESTING HORIZONTAL EQUITY: MODELS AND METHODOLOGY
The primary objective of our investigation was to determine the horizontal equity among apartment, industrial, offi ce, and retail properties in Maricopa County. Horizontal equity results when the assessment ratio (AV/SP) is uniform across properties with similar market values (IAAO, 1978; Allen and Dare, 2002) . Relevant studies of horizontal equity in ad valorem property taxation include Berry and Bednarz (1975) , Haurin and Jensen (1988) , Goolsby (1997) , and Allen and Dare (2002) , all of whom examined single-family residential properties; DeCesare and Ruddock (1998) , who examined apartments in Brazil; and Kowalski and Colwell (1986) , who examined industrial land.
In this study we used three techniques to examine horizontal equity across property types. First, we calculated an F-statistic to test the equality of mean assessment ratios across apartment, industrial, offi ce, and retail properties. Second, we applied the Goolsby (1997) assessment ratio model to the data set and tested the signifi cance of the property type coeffi cients to determine if inequity existed horizontally across property types. Third, we applied the Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric test and examined the equality of assessment ratios across the four property types. Following is a more detailed explanation of each of these techniques.
Technique 1
The F-statistic is used to test the equality of mean assessment ratios (AR) across the four property types. The null hypothesis is as follows: H 0 :AR Apartment = AR Industrial = AR Offi ce = AR Retail . We reject the null hypothesis when the F-statistic exceeds the F-value as determined by the F-distribution.
Technique 2
The Goolsby (1997) model regresses the assessment ratio on a vector of independent property characteristics and location variables as follows:
where X is a vector of independent property characteristic, location, ownership, and time variables and a i is a vector of coeffi cients to be estimated. For horizontal equity, the null hypothesis is H 0 :a i = 0, suggesting that no property characteristic, location, ownership form, or time component has signifi cant infl uence on the assessment ratio. A signifi cant coeffi cient on an independent variable implies horizontal inequity. For instance, if a geographic binary variable is positive and signifi cant, we conclude that the assessment ratio is higher for properties in that geographic area compared with similar properties in the omitted geographic area, thus leading to inequity between these properties.
15
14 Berry and Bednarz (1975) were the fi rst to regress the assessment ratio on property characteristic variables. Goolsby (1997) later added the log-linear specifi cation that is used more frequently today. 15 Another technique that has been used in the literature is the Allen and Dare (2002) model as follows:
where,
X is a vector of independent property characteristic, location, and ownership variables that may be related to inequity, and β is a vector of coeffi cients to be estimated. The absolute value of the difference between the property's assessment ratio and the mean assessment ratio for the n properties is a measure of an individual property's horizontal inequity. The coeffi cients in the regression provide insight into the determinants of AV SP ) (
The Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric test pools and ranks the assessment ratios in ascending order and then determines whether the differences are suffi ciently large to indicate systematic differences in assessment levels (Gloudemans, 1999) . The null hypothesis assumes that the four property types-apartment, industrial, offi ce, and retail-are appraised at equal percentages of market value.
16
Application of the Goolsby (1997) Methodology to Empirical Data
The independent variables used in technique 2 are divided into seven categories: (1) property type, (2) seller's state of residency, (3) general property characteristics, (4) exterior construction materials, (5) geographic location, (6) property condition, and (7) year sold. The fi rst category of variables includes the property type classifi cations that are the focus of this paper. In this study there are four property types: apartment, industrial, offi ce, and retail. Each of these variables is included in the model as a binary variable, except apartment properties, which is the omitted variable.
The second category contains only one variable-the seller's state of residency. The data set includes the seller's address, which allowed us to segregate out-of-state sellers from those in-state.
The assessed values used in this analysis were obtained for each property as of the date of sale. By including this variable in the analysis, we were able to determine if out-of-state sellers are over-or underassessed compared with in-state sellers. Our expectation was that the location of the owner should not enter into the appraisal of the property and should not contribute to the nonuniformity of the property tax. Finding otherwise may suggest that nonproperty-related factors enter into the appraisal of each property type.
The third category considers the general characteristics of the property, including square footage, number of fl oors, land-tobuilding ratio, and building age. In this case, taking the natural log of building square feet and number of fl oors accounts for nonlinearity in these variables and allows for easy interpretation of the coefficients as elasticities. Building age squared is also included in the model; it addresses the expected declining rate of depreciation typically observed in real estate.
The fourth category represents the types of exterior construction materials used in the buildings, including block, block and stucco, frame, and other miscellaneous materials. Each of these variables is included in the model as a binary variable except block, which was the omitted variable.
The fifth category includes the geographic location of the properties within horizontal inequity for the sample data. For instance, a positive and signifi cant coeffi cient on a continuous independent variable suggests that an increase in the variable leads to an increase in the absolute value of horizontal inequity. Although the Allen and Dare (2002) model is creative in construction, we fi nd it less insightful for investigating and testing horizontal equity compared with the other methods used in this study; therefore, we do not recommend this technique as a primary method for examining horizontal equity. We did, however, apply this methodology to the Phoenix data and found the results consistent with the other techniques used in this study. 16 The test statistic in the Kruskal-Wallis test, H, is defi ned as:
where k is the number of property groups, n j is the number of ratios in the jth group, N is the total number of ratios in all groups, and R j is the sum of the ranks for the jth group. H is evaluated as a chi-square with k -1 degrees of freedom, where k is the number of property groups. The sixth category includes the property condition. The inspection process performed by CoStar Group Inc. resulted in each property being assigned to one of fi ve condition categories-excellent, good, average, fair, or poor. In our working data set, relatively few properties were categorized as excellent or poor; therefore, excellent and good were combined to create a new binary variable, "better than average," and fair and poor were combined to create a new binary variable, "worse than average." Average was the omitted variable.
The seventh category controls for the year of sale for each property by including annual binary variables ranging from 1999 to 2003, with 1998 being the omitted variable.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Horizontal equity results when the assessment ratio is uniform across properties with similar market values (IAAO, 1978; Allen and Dare, 2002) . Therefore, the fi rst step of the empirical analysis required that we segregate the data to conform to the "similar market value" requirement. In an effort to ensure robust results, we employed three different separating criteria: (1) mortgage lender's underwriting approach, (2) quintiles based on sales price and number of observations, and (3) the Clapp (1990) approach based on a market value signal derived from both sales price and assessed value.
Lenders use different mortgage underwriting criteria based on the market value or sales price of a property. An ad hoc survey of mortgage lenders found three underwriting levels common in commercial real estate lending: (1) properties with a market value less than $500,000; (2) properties with a market value between $500,000 and $3,000,000; and 3) properties with a market value greater than $3,000,000. These three price levels provided one method for segregating the data and satisfying the "similar market value" requirement.
For the second segregation criteria, we separated the data into quintiles. Specifically, we arrayed the data in ascending order by sales price, and then separated the data into quintiles based on the number of observations. For the third segregation criteria, we used the Clapp (1990) approach. In this approach, price level one requires both the assessed value and the sales price to rank in the bottom one third of the data; price level three requires both assessed value and sales price to rank in the top one third of the data; and price level two captures the remaining observations. The Clapp approach segregates the data three ways. However, rather than relying solely on the sales price to signal market value, as in the lender criteria, the Clapp approach also incorporates the assessor's estimate of value. It stands to reason that if both the sales price and the assessed value are in the top one-third of the data, the actual market value would be in the top one-third of the data. For the bottom one-third and the remainder, we would expect a similar relationship. Table 3 summarizes the price ranges and percent of observations for each of the segregation methods.
For the lender criterion, the second price level captured about one half of the observations. For the Clapp criterion, the second price level also captured almost one half of the observations. Even though the second price level for both the lender and Clapp criterion captured about one half the observations, enough transactions remained in the other price levels to allow meaningful statistical analysis. By defi nition, the quintiles require a similar number of observations; however, the number of observations was not precisely equal because the breakpoints sometimes fell on transactions with the same sales price and, thus, required a slight adjustment. Table 3 also displays the coeffi cient of dispersion (COD) for each price level. The COD measures the degree of dispersion around the median assessment ratio by calculating the average percent deviation from the median.
17 Although the COD is not a formal test for horizontal equity, we expect it to be relatively uniform across different property types with similar market values. In the fi rst price level for all segregation methods, the CODs for apartments and industrial properties were very similar; however, in all other price levels, the COD became larger from apartment properties to industrial properties, to office properties, and finally to retail properties. Also, the COD for retail properties was larger than for other property types in all price levels for each segregation method. These fi ndings suggest that industrial properties are perhaps more diffi cult to value than apartments, offi ce properties are harder to value than industrial properties, and retail properties are more diffi cult to value than offi ce properties.
An examination of the mean assessment ratios in Table 3 provides additional insight into possible horizontal inequity across apartment, industrial, offi ce, and retail properties. In fact, four general observations are apparent from the table. First, retail properties are always underassessed relative to all other property classes (i.e., in every instance in the table, retail properties have the lowest mean assessment ratio of all properties). Second, office properties are generally overassessed relative to all other properties, but this is primarily driven by the lower property values (less than $1 million). Third, for higher property values, there is little-to-no difference among non-retail properties. Fourth, for the highest-valued properties (for all three ranking methods), apartments have the highest mean assessment ratio of all properties.
The retail property anomaly found in both the COD and the mean assessment ratio calculations may result from the diffi culty of appraising retail properties. It is commonly known that the heterogeneity of retail properties is often greater than the other property types considered in this study. For instance, retail properties include anchor grocers, boutique in-line space, fast food restaurants, and regional mall space, to name just a few. This heterogeneity, of course, is problematic in mass appraisal.
After studying the general characteristics of the data, we statistically examined the horizontal equity across the four property types. The F-statistic tests the equality of the mean assessment ratios 17 The COD is found using the following formula:
where N is the number of properties, R i is the assessed ratio for property i, and R med is the median of these ratios. One negative aspect of the COD measure is a scale problem. For example, assume the median assessment ratio for group A is 100, while the ratio for group B is 50. Even though the medians are very different for each group, the COD measure could be the same for both, depending on the distribution of the assessment ratios about the median. This scale problem limits the interpretation of the COD measure (Bowman and Mikesell, 1978) . The coeffi cient of variation (COV), which measures the dispersion of assessment ratios about the mean, suffers from the same scale problem as the COD. Because the COD is a frequently cited measure in the assessment literature, and is understood and preferred by assessing offi cers, we have elected to use this measure rather than the COV.
across the four property types for each price level. As shown in Table 3 , in each price level of the three segregation criteria, the null hypothesis of equality of assessment ratios was rejected at the 0.01 level, suggesting horizontal inequity across all four property types.
Because of the stark difference in retail property mean assessment ratios compared with the other property types, it is reasonable to suspect that the retail property anomaly is driving the Fstatistic test results. To test this hypothesis, we removed the retail property data and recalculated the F-statistic across the three remaining property types. The results of this analysis are reported in the last column of Table 3 . As observed, the F-statistic is still signifi cant at the 0.05 level in many of the price levels across the three segregation methods. These fi ndings suggest that although inclusion of retail properties increases the overall nonuniformity of assessment ratios across the four property types, the nonuniformity among the remaining three property types remains signifi cant and suboptimal for property tax purposes. 18 We now turn our attention to the regression results from the Goolsby (1997) model. We use two approaches within the Goolsby regression methodology to control for "similar market values." First, as observed in Table 4 , we use the entire dataset and regress the natural log of the assessment ratio on a vector of independent variables, including binary price level variables consistent with the lender, quintile, and Clapp segregation methods. Second, as observed in Table 5 , we apply the Goolsby (1997) model to each price level for each segregation method. Both of these techniques control for the "similar market value" requirement in the defi nition of horizontal equity; however, both methodologies have strengths and weaknesses. The first methodology has the advantage of using the entire dataset in the calculation, thereby strengthening the results. In addition, the coeffi cients on the price level binary variables allow for an examination of vertical equity. However, it could be argued that the individual binary price level variables, as specifi ed, do not adequately control for "similar market values." Table  5 overcomes this potential criticism by generating separate regressions for each price level within the three segregation criteria; however, the results from this method may be less robust due to the smaller sample sizes. We note that for both techniques, the coeffi cients on the property type variables provide an indication of horizontal equity.
We will now discuss the results from the fi rst method (Table 4) followed by a discussion of the results from the second method (Table 5) . Table 4 shows that industrial property assessment ratios were not statistically different from apartment property ratios. However, the assessment ratio was found to increase with office properties and decrease with retail properties, compared with apartment properties. 19 The statistical significance of these results leads us to conclude that horizontal inequity 18 Table 2 results are a univariate analysis and do not control for other factors affecting assessment ratios. This is in contrast to Table 5 results, which do control for other factors, leading to somewhat different inferences between the tables. 19 These fi ndings are consistent with the assessment ratios shown in Table 3 , where the assessment ratio for offi ce properties is always higher than for apartments at each price level, except for the highest-valued properties, and the assessment ratio for retail properties is always lower than for apartments at each price level. In an effort to mitigate the adverse impact (i.e., more tax appeals) of less reliable appraisals for retail properties, an assessor may deliberately underassess these properties. This, of course, is just one possible explanation of the retail property anomaly, for we have no direct or indirect knowledge of this possible strategy on the part of the Maricopa County Assessor's offi ce.
exists between the four property types. Specifi cally, the results show that, compared with apartments, retail properties are underassessed and offi ce properties are overassessed. In short, offi ce property owners are carrying a disproportionate and heavier tax burden, whereas retail property owners are paying a lower share of property taxes. As a secondary confi rmation, we also generated an F-statistic on the equality of the property type coeffi cients. Among all segregation methods, the F-statistic was signifi cant at the 0.01 level, confirming horizontal inequity across the four property types.
The analysis also reveals that the assessment ratio is infl uenced by the property owner's state of residence. In fact, the analysis showed that the assessment ratio is higher for properties owned by out-of-state residents. This result is not necessarily indicative of a deliberate attempt by the assessor's offi ce to overassess properties owned by out-ofstate owners, but it could be the result of an overpayment when the property was initially purchased. Lambson, McQueen, and Slade (2004) found that out-of-state buyers frequently pay a premium compared to in-state buyers because of higher search costs and anchoring-induced bias. In short, the assessor may be changing the assessed valuation of a property when a transaction is recorded. This explanation is enhanced by the fact that the assessor reports the cost approach is used in the annual valuation of retail, offi ce, and industrial properties. If the new assessed valuation refl ects the premium paid by an out-ofstate buyer, and if the assessor thereafter trends the assessed value by a cost factor observed in the market, then the assessed valuation will remain higher for properties owned by out-of-state residents.
In either case, these results suggest that the Maricopa County assessor should examine this issue and make necessary adjustments to address this apparent inequity.
As for the remaining variables, the analysis found that the assessment ratio increases with building size, land-tobuilding ratio (LTB), 20 building age, East Valley location, and properties in worse-than-average condition.
The assessment ratio declined for properties constructed of unconventional building materials and for properties in better-than-average condition. In many respects, the findings on the building condition variables were expected in mass appraisal, unless a deliberate attempt was made to control for property condition. In other words, we expected to see that properties in better-than-average condition were underassessed, while properties in worse-than-average condition were overassessed. It is also not surprising to see that properties in certain geographic areas-in this case, the East Valley-were over-or underassessed compared with similar properties located in other geographic areas.
Finally, the coefficients on the price level binary variables provide insight into possible vertical inequity, which occurs when the assessment ratio is not stable across different price ranges for the same property type. In this case, the omitted variable is the fi rst price level within the various segregation methods. Vertical equity exists if the coeffi cients on the price level variables equal zero. We used an Fstatistic to test the equality of coeffi cients across different price levels. For all three price segregation methods, the F-statistic was signifi cant at the 0.01 level, suggesting vertical inequity across the different price levels. We also note that negative coeffi cients imply a regressive property tax. That is, as property price increases, the AV/SV ratio decreases. Although not the primary focus of this study, these results suggest that vertical inequity should be examined by the assessor's offi ce.
Next we turn our attention to Table 5 that includes separate regressions for each price level for each of the three segregation methods.
The overall results from this alternative methodology are consistent with the prior analysis, i.e., Table 4 ; however, the fi ndings are generally less robust. This is not necessarily unexpected due to the smaller sample sizes that result from this methodology. Under the lender criteria, the assessment ratios for industrial properties were not statistically different than apartments. This same relationship is observed for the Clapp criteria; however, in quintile 2 industrial properties are underassessed compared with apartments. Offi ce properties were found to be overassessed in two 20 The coeffi cient on the LTB ratio is positive and signifi cant, implying that as the LTB increases, so does the assessment ratio, which is counter to our expectation. For instance, in Panel A of Table 2 we found that the LTB ratio for retail properties is much higher than the other property types; however, the assessment ratio for retail properties is much lower than the other property types. Therefore, we expected to see the coeffi cient on the LTB ratio to be negative. There is suspicion that the large land component in retail properties may make the reliable assessment of these properties more diffi cult, especially when the cost approach is used as the sole valuation method; however, the coeffi cient on the LTB ratio does not support this conjecture.
of the three lender criteria, four of the fi ve quintile criteria, and all of the Clapp criteria, suggesting that offi ce properties are consistently overassessed compared with apartment properties in Maricopa County. The retail property results are less robust, but still consistent with the fi ndings in Table 4 . For both the lender and Clapp criteria, the coeffi cient on retail properties is negative and signifi cant for only one of the price levels. For the quintile criteria, none of the retail property coeffi cients is statistically signifi cant, inferring that the small sample sizes are limiting the robustness of the results. As for the seller out-of-state variable, the coeffi cients are positive and signifi cant in two of the three lender criteria, two of the fi ve quintile criteria, and one of the three Clapp criteria. Similar to the prior results in Table 4 it is clear that out-of-state property owners are overassessed compared with local owners. Even though the individual coeffi cients were sometimes statistically insignifi cant, the F-statistic, which tested the equality of the coefficients between industrial, offi ce, and retail properties, was statistically signifi cant for all price levels in all segregation criteria, strongly indicating that horizontal inequity is prevalent in the property taxation of commercial properties in Maricopa County, Arizona.
We now examine horizontal equity from a nonparametric perspective. Specifically, we used the Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric test. This test pools and ranks the assessment ratios in ascending order and then determines whether the differences in the average rank between the four property types are suffi ciently large to indicate systematic differences in assessment levels. At a predetermined confidence level, an H-statistic determines if the average ranks are statistically different. Table 6 summarizes the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test for the three segregation methods and associated price levels.
The H-statistic is signifi cant at the 0.01 level in every case; therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that apartment, industrial, offi ce, and retail properties are appraised at the same percentage of market value.
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Similar to Table 3 , we regenerated the Sales Price Range results after eliminating retail property from the data to examine nonuniformity across the three remaining property types. As identifi ed by the last column in Table  6 , the Kruskel-Wallis statistic remains signifi cant among many of the price levels, suggesting that even when retail properties are eliminated from the analysis, horizontal inequity is found in the property taxation of commercial properties.
CONCLUSION AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The uniformity of assessment ratios is important for ensuring equity in the property taxation of business properties. However, empirical studies on this topic are virtually nonexistent. This study investigates the horizontal equity of assessed valuations across apartment, industrial, offi ce, and retail properties in Maricopa County, Arizona over a fi ve and one-half year period, from January 1998 through June 2003. Three methods were employed in this investigation. First, we calculated an F-statistic to test the equality of mean assessment ratios over the four property types that fall within similar price ranges. The null hypothesis of equality of means was rejected for each price segment, suggesting horizontal inequity. These general results were robust even when we eliminated retail properties from the analysis.
Second, we applied the Goolsby (1997) model to test the uniformity of assessment ratios across the four property types. We applied this analysis using two separate methodologies; however the overall fi ndings were consistent across the two techniques. Specifi cally, the analysis showed that apartment and industrial properties are assessed at equal percentages of market value; however, offi ce properties are overassessed compared with apartments, and retail properties are underassessed compared with apartments. These results were robust across the different price segregation methods. The Goolsby (1997) method also showed regressive vertical inequity exists across the different price segregation methods.
Third, we applied the Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric test to the data and concluded that horizontal inequity exists across apartment, industrial, offi ce, and retail properties in Maricopa County, Arizona. These results were robust for each price segregation method, and remained robust even when retail properties were eliminated from the analysis.
The economic impact of these fi ndings is not trivial. From the results generated by the Goolsby (1997) method, we found that the overassessment of offi ce properties compared to apartments ranged from 11.67 to 18.11 percent, and that the underassessment of retail properties ranged from 0.33 to 11.63 percent (see Table 4 ). We can calculate the impact of the over-and underassessment on property values by fi rst estimating the difference in property taxes and then capitalizing the difference at a market cap rate. First, we estimated the property tax on properties that are not over-or underassessed as follows:
[2] PT 0 = ETR * SP, where PT equals the property tax, ETR equals the effective tax rate for commercial properties in Maricopa County, and SP equals the sales price or property value. Next we estimated the property tax on properties that are over-or underassessed as follows:
[3] PT 1 = ETR * SP * (1 + λ), where λ equals the percentage of over-or underassessment. The difference between PT 0 and PT 1 is the amount of the tax premium or tax savings that results from the over-or underassessment. Capitalizing the property tax difference (PTD) by the market cap rate (R 0 ) results in an estimate of property value change (VΔ) attributed to horizontal inequity. Specifi cally, the calculation is as follows:
[4] VΔ = .
The estimated effective tax rate (ETR) for commercial properties in Maricopa County in 2002 was 3.411 percent. 22 We also note that the mean sales price for offi ce and retail properties was $2.8 million and $2.0 million, respectively. The regression analysis in Table 4 fi nds that λ ranges from 0.1167 to 0.1811 for offi ce properties and -0.0033 to -0.1163 for retail properties. The CCIM Institute, which tracks cap rates for commercial properties, reports that during the time period under investigation, cap rates were about 9.0 percent for both offi ce and retail properties. Using these data and the above methodology, we calculated the range of valuation decline attributed to horizontal inequity of $123,842 to $192,183 for offi ce properties and a range of valuation increase attributed to horizontal inequity of $2,501 to $88,155 for retail properties.
While these results cannot be generalized to all apartment, industrial, offi ce, and retail properties, this study demonstrates how horizontal equity can be identifi ed and measured, providing valuable insight to both tax assessors and property owners and moving toward more equitable property tax assessment.
Our fi ndings also offer insight into the appraisal processes for commercial properties. First, an obvious area for additional analysis is the fi nding that out-of-state owners face higher levels of assessment. This may result from the way assessed valuations are modified when new transactions occur or from other forms of bias. Second, the lower assessment ratios on retail properties suggest that retail properties are harder to value compared with the other three property types. The evidence suggests that the cost approach contributes to uniformity for commercial and industrial properties, but it does not appear to work as well for retail properties or offi ce properties. We speculate that retail proprieties are more sensitive to nuances in the market, i.e., today's successful espresso shop can easily become tomorrow's outdated coffee shop and the cost approach is less likely to capture such changes. We have similar concerns about using the cost approach for offi ce properties. We also believe that the LTB ratio works against uniformity for retail properties. Under the assumption that the Maricopa County assessor's offi ce has limited resources, a fi rst step might be to explore using a method other than the cost approach for retail properties.
Other variables suggest that public assessors need to be sensitive to the location of the property, the square footage of the improvements, and the age of the improvements. Taken individually, each of the variables associated with the horizontal and vertical equity is not fatal, but prudence suggests assessors in Maricopa County, and their counterparts in other jurisdictions, should carefully consider how appraisals on commercial properties are conducted and be active in making adjustments when necessary.
